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Viewpoint

Neuroprediction: New technology, old problems
Stephen J. Morsea
a Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor of Law, Professor of Psychology & Law in Psychiatry,
Associate Director of the Center for Neuroscience & Society, University of Pennsylvania

Neuroprediction is the use of structural or functional
brain or nervous system variables to make any type of
prediction, including medical prognoses and behavioral forecasts, such as an indicator of future dangerous behavior for the purpose of involuntary civil commitment. This note will focus on behavioral predictions,
but the analysis applies to any context. The general
thesis is that using neurovariables for prediction is a
new technology, but that it raises no new ethical issues,
at least for now.
Institutions, including the legal system, routinely use
behavioral predictions, which can have momentous
implications for the life of the individual, for institutions and for society at large. In the non-legal realm
consider predictive tests for admission to educational
institutions or employment opportunities. In the law,
predictions can have particularly grave consequences,
including the loss of liberty. For examples, the following
all centrally involve a prediction of future dangerous
conduct: involuntary civil commitment of the mentally
ill, including so-called “mentally abnormal sexually violent predators”, granting bail to a criminal defendant,
sentencing a criminal defendant, potentially even to
death in the United States in many states, and granting
parole. In principle, neurodata alone or in conjunction
with other types of variables might be used for these
and myriad other predictions.
Such serious and potentially intrusive prediction decisions raise important ethical issues. Nonetheless, private, semi-public and public institutions have all made
the normative judgment that employing predictions is
justifiable and, indeed, it is unlikely that any of these
institutions could function adequately without them.
The question is what criteria are and should be used to
decide if a particular prediction is justifiable. I believe
that there are two major considerations: the accuracy
of the prediction, which is an empirical question; and
the rate and type of inevitable prediction errors that
are acceptable given the interests of the predictor and
subject of the prediction, including whether other important values are potentially violated by gathering
the basic data necessary for the prediction. We shall
discuss these generally in order and then will turn to
how neuroprediction bears on both.
No predictive method is error free, much like all diagnostic tests. All produce both false positives and false
negatives, and low base rate behavior, such as suicide
or homicide, is particularly prone to false positive predictions. At present, three methods are primarily used

for behavioral prediction: clinical judgment guided by
the clinician’s own training and experience; structured
professional judgment in which the clinician typically
uses a validated actuarial or semi-actuarial tool but
then can modify the result using professional judgment; and actuarial, in which the data gathered are
largely objective and then a statistically validated algorithm is applied. The comparative efficacy of these
three methods is much-studied and the conclusion is
inescapable that clinical judgment is the least accurate.
There is dispute about whether actuarial is superior to
structured professional judgment, but both are more
accurate than clinical judgment. Even the best validated predictive methodologies still have substantial
error rates, however, which motivates the search for
better tools. Interestingly, the search does not require
theoretical understanding of the causes of behavior,
although such understanding might well improve predictions. It is sufficient if a large data base provides
reasonably accurate markers even if the reason that a
variable predicts accurately is not understood.
Deciding what rate and types of error are justifiable is
a normative issue that can be resolved only by balancing the various interests implicated by the prediction,
including the consequences to the subject and society
and the cost of producing the prediction. Consider the
example of involuntary civil commitment based on a
prediction of future dangerousness. Forced hospitalization and mental health treatment are an enormous
intrusion on liberty, but avoiding harm to self or others
is an entirely worthy goal. The more serious the harm
predicted, the greater weight that must be given to
harm-reduction, but how many people may appropriately be hospitalized who would not cause serious
harm in order to prevent one person who will? Do we
prefer to hospitalize unnecessarily to prevent a few
harms or to hospitalize infrequently knowing that some
preventable harms will result? These and similar questions can only be resolved morally, politically and legally taking into account actual error rates and costs
for various types of prediction, assuming that such data
are available.
Gathering the information necessary to make a prediction may involve the intrusion on other important
values even if the variables involved may increase the
accuracy of a prediction. Consider the example of privacy. A subject’s genetic background, alcohol consumption and sexual activity may all increase the accuracy
of some types of prediction, but obtaining these data
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will surely intrude on the subject’s privacy. Moreover,
many types of data can be put to nefarious uses. These
are familiar issues in bioethics that are often raised
when considering health insurance and gathering public health information generally. Whether the intrusion
is justifiable is again a normative question that can be
answered only by balancing the interests involved.
Now let us turn to the implications of neuroprediction
for the above considerations. At present, there are very
few neuropredictive tools for behavioral prediction.
There are some “proof of concept” studies indicating
that adding a neural variable to behavioral measures
can increase slightly the accuracy of predictions of
anti-social conduct, but these techniques are simply not
sufficiently established to be used for public policy purposes. There are interesting studies suggesting that
neural variables can help predict which mental health
treatments will be effective with some types of patients,
but such predictions do not raise the types of ethical
concern that predictions of anti-social conduct or other
types of socially consequential predictions do. In short,
neuroprediction for public policy purposes is at present
more of a hope than a reality, but future studies will
certainly provide better data. Moreover, we can predict
quite confidently, that as the neuroprediction tools become more refined and produce a larger data base, we
will be able to have a sense of how accurate they are
alone or in tandem with other predictive methods. This
will require expensive, methodologically difficult studies to perform, however, so I suspect that well-validated
neuroprediction tools will not be produced in the near
future. Note that there is nothing unique about neuroprediction in this respect. We can ask the question of
comparative accuracy about any technique.
Assuming that we have a sufficient data base to know
the error rates of various types of neuroprediction, will
it be justified to use this methodology? We have already
decided as a society that predictions are normatively
justified. If neural variables increase the accuracy of
such predictions, are not unduly costly to obtain and do
not intrude on other values we endorse, what possible
argument could there be for not using neural variables? How could we possibly justify engaging in a
practice less successfully when a technique is available
to do it better? Those who worry that neuroprediction
may someday be “too” accurate have a substantial burden to explain why too much accuracy will undermine
the well-established normative justifiability of predictive practices. Note again that the same questions can
be raised about any technique that increases accuracy,
whether it is genetic, neural or behavioral.
Is there something unique about neuroprediction that
raises new ethical issues? Obtaining structural and
functional brain scans is now quite expensive, but so
are some behavioral measures, such as obtaining a
psychopathy score using the Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised, and the costs of scans and other neural
measurement techniques will surely decrease over

time. By analogy, consider how much less it costs to
sequence an individual’s genome than when the technique was first devised. And yet again, considering the
cost of neuroprediction raises no new issues. Cost must
always be balanced against the potential increase in
accuracy for any prediction tool.
Does collecting neural data for prediction intrude more
fundamentally on privacy and dignity than other techniques? Virtually all conceivable neural measures will
involve “brain reading”, not mind reading. Although
there are now relatively accurate neural measures that
can identify beyond chance whether, for example, a
subject is adding or subtracting, or looking at a place or
a face, these techniques do not identify the particular
content of the cognition. They do not indicate what
numbers are being added or subtracted or what precise face or place is being observed. They simply identify those regions of brain activity that are associated
with the general activity in question. The same will be
true of neuroprediction. Neural variables associated
with the predicted behavior will not provide access to
the content of the subject’s mental states. If neural techniques could genuinely read minds, a hitherto unimaginable ethical challenge would be raised, but such an
ability is science fiction at present.
There are a host of other issues neuroprediction raises
that are thoroughly familiar to bioethicists because
they are also raised by other techniques, such as the
right response to incidental findings, whether the technique can be used without the subject’s cooperation,
and whether the data collected can be put to illegitimate uses. Even in the unlikely event that neuroprediction were to raise such issues more acutely than other
techniques, only the magnitude of the issue and not its
novelty is raised. At a certain point, of course, changes
in quantity produce changes in quality, but there is little reason to believe that neuroprediction raises such a
possibility.
In conclusion, neuroprediction may or may not become
a useful tool, but if it does, we already fully possess the
ethical theoretical resources to address any resulting
ethical and legal challenges.
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